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observations. Id. Thus, the Court conclud-
ed that in Greenwood's case, an expecta-
tion of privacy in trash left on a public 
street did not deserve protection from 
police warrantless searches and seizures as 
an expectation society was prepared to 
honor.ld. 
Rather, than conclude that Greenwood's 
expectation had been frustrated, the Court 
relied on the unanimous rejection of simi-
lar claims by the Federal Courts of Appeal. 
In each of these cases, the courts found 
that a reasonable expectation of privacy 
did not exist with respect to trash discard-
ed outside the home and the curtilage 
thereof, thus being accessible to war-
rantless searches and seizures. Id. [Cita-
tions omitted.] 
On the issue of whether an expectation 
of privacy in garbage should be deemed 
reasonable as a matter of federal law when 
the warrantless search and seizure of gar-
bage is impermissible as a matter of state 
law, the majority stated that state law may 
impose more stringent constraints in 
police conduct involving searches than fed-
eral law. Id. at 1630. However, the Court 
declared that "there is no such understand-
ing with respect to garbage left for collec-
tion at the side of a public street." Id. at 
1630-31. 
Finally, the Court noted that evidence 
obtained in violation of state law need not 
be suppressed within the scope of the 
fourth amendment exclusionary rule when 
the benefits of deterring police misconduct 
do not outweigh the costs of excluding 
reliable evidence of criminal activity. Id. at 
1631. Since the state may eliminate the 
exclusionary rule as a remendy for viola-
tions of that right, the majority held that 
it may also adopt a similar balancing 
approach in concluding that "the benefits 
of excluding relevant evidence of criminal 
activity do not outweigh the costs when 
police conduct at issue does not violate fed-
erallaw." Id Therefore, the Court found 
no merit in Greenwood's argument that 
because California eliminated the exclu-
sionary rule for evidence seized in viola-
tion of state, but not federal law, the state 
violated the Due Process Clause of the 
fourteenth amendment. Id. 
Justice Brennan, with Justice Marshall, 
dissented. Brennan opined that individuals 
have the reasonable expectation that the 
aspects of their private lives are concealed 
safely in a trash bag free from examination 
and inspection wherever they may be as 
long as the contents are not in "plain 
view," thus enjoying protection under the 
fourth amendment. Id at 1633. In conclu-
ding that an expectation of privacy attach-
es to any container unless "it so clearly 
announces its contents," the dissent 
argued that trash bags are to be afforded 
fourth amendment protection. Citing Rob-
bins v. California, 453 U.S. 420 (1981), 
Brennan contended: 
[E]ven if one wished to import such a 
distinction into the fourth amend-
ment, it is difficult if not impossible to 
perceive any objective criteria by 
which that task might be accomplish-
ed. What one person may put into a 
suitcase, another may put into a paper 
bag ... And ... no court, no constable, 
no citizen, can sensibly be asked to dis-
tinguish the relative "privacy 
interests" in a closed suitcase, brief-
case, portfolio, duffle bag, or box. 
Id. at 426-27, quoted in California v. 
Greenwood, at 1632. 
The dissent found the majority's analysis 
to be unpersuasive on the theory that trash 
is abandoned and therefore not entitled to 
an expectation of privacy. Brennan 
explained that an expectation of privacy 
cannot be negated when a person seeks to 
preserve as private the disposal of refuge. 
Greenwood, 108 S.Ct. at 1637. He reasoned 
that the voluntary relinquishment of 
possession or control over an item does 
not lose fourth amendment protection, 
even if placed in a mailbox, and therefore 
the possibility of such an intrusion by 
third parties should not justify a war-
rantless search by police. Thus, as viewed 
by Brennan and Marshall, it was unreason-
able for the majority to have concluded 
that Greenwood had no expectation of 
privacy in his trash. To hold that the war-
rantless search of disposed trash was con-
sistent with the fourth amendment, the 
court "paints a grim picture of our socie-
ty." Id. at 1636-37. 
In Greenwood, the Court failed to 
address whether the curtilage question 
should be resolved with particular refer-
ence to the proximity of the area claimed 
to be "curtilage" to the home. Addition-
ally, the Court did not give effect to the 
fact that trash bags used by Greenwood 
were opaque and not in "plain view," a 
factor generally recognized as constituting 
items free from police warrantless searches 
and seizures under the fourth amendment. 
While the Court rejected the notion that 
an expectation of privacy may not extend 
to garbage placed on a public street, and 
that its contents may be seized without a 
warrant, it necessarily follows that persons 
engaged in noncriminal activity will no 
longer be able to dwell in reasonable secu-
rity and freedom from surveillance, as such 
is an expectation no longer protected by 
the courts as one society now honors. 
-Gloria S. Wilson 
B.N. v. K.K.: FRAUD, INTENTIONAL 
INFLICTION OF EMOTIONAL DIS-
TRESS, AND NEGLIGENCE 
APPLICABLE WHEN RESULTING 
FROM SEXUAL TRANSMISSIONS 
OF DANGEROUS, CONTAGIOUS 
AND INCURABLE DISEASE 
In B.N. v. K.K, 312 Md. 135, 538 A.2d 
1175 (1988), the Court of Appeals of 
Maryland, in a case certified by the United 
States District Court for the District of 
Maryland, held that Maryland does recog-
nize causes of action for fraud, intentional 
infliction of emotional distress and negli-
gence, resulting from the sexual transmis-
sion of a dangerous, contagious, and 
incurable disease, such as genital herpes. 
Each named cause of action, however, is 
subject to the proper factual showing by 
the plaintiff and any defense raised by the 
defendant. 
Ms. N. was employed as a nurse at Johns 
Hopkins Hospital in Baltimore, Maryland, 
between July and December, 1983. Dr. K. 
also worked at Hopkins Hospital for part 
of that period. From July through 
Ocotber, 1983, Ms. N. and Dr. K. "were 
involved in an lntlIDate boyfriend-
girlfriend relationship" and "engaged in 
acts of sexual intercourse." Id. at 138, 538 
A.2d at 1177. While this was going on, Dr. 
K. knew he had genital herpes, but did not 
disclose this to Ms. N., who neither knew 
nor had any reason to believe that Dr. K. 
was a carrier of genital herpes. Id On or 
about October 1, 1983, Ms. N. and Dr. K. 
engaged in sexual intercourse. On that date 
Dr. K. knew that his disease was active and 
would probably be transmitted to Ms. N. 
through sexual intercourse. That result in 
fact occurred and was caused by Dr. K.'s 
conduct, inasmuch as Ms. N. never 
engaged in sexual contact with anyone but 
Dr. K. during the relevant period. Id at 
138-9, 538 A.2d at 1177. 
Ms. N. brought suit against Dr. K. in the 
United States District Court for the Dis-
trict of Maryland, alleging fraud, inten-
tional infliction of emotional distress, 
negligence and assault and battery. The 
case was then certified to the Court of 
Appeals of Maryland by the U.S. District 
Court pursuant to the Maryland Uniform 
Certification of Questions of Law Act, 
Md. Cts. & Jud. Proc. Code Ann., §§12-
601 through 12-609 (1984 Repl. Vol.). 
The question certified asked: 
Does Maryland Recognize A Cause Of 
Action For Either Fraud, Intentional 
Infliction of Emotional Distress, Or 
Negligence Resulting From the Sexual 
Transmission Of A Dangerous, Conta-
gious, and Incurable Disease, Such As 
Genital Herpes? 
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Id. at 138, 538 A.2d at 1176. The certifica-
tion order by the federal court instructed 
the court of appeals that: 
The sufficiency of the Plaintiff's Com-
plaint regarding the allegations of the 
elements of each tort is not part of the 
certified question. The Court of 
Appeals is asked to assume the suffi-
ciency of each Count of the Com-
plaint as plead by the Plaintiff [Ms. 
N.], the facts are those facts alleged by 
the complainant in support of her 
causes of action. 
Id. 
To begin its analysis, the court stated the 
traditional elements of a cause of action in 
negligence: 
1. A duty, or obligation, recognized by 
the law, requiring the person to con-
form to a certain standard of conduct, 
for the protection of others against 
unreasonable risks; 
2. A failure on the person's part to 
conform to the standard required: a 
breach of the duty ... ; 
3. A reasonably close causal connec-
tion between the conduct and the 
resulting injury ... ; 
4. Actual loss or damage resulting to 
the interests of another .... 
Id. at 141, 538 A.2d at 1178. 
The notion of duty is founded on the 
"responsibility each of us bears to exercise 
due care to avoid unreasonable risks of 
harm to others." Id. (citing Morgan v. 
Faberge, 273 Md. 538, 543, 332 A.2d 11, 15 
(1975)). Furthermore, "[ w ]hen a reasona-
ble person knows or should have known 
that certain types of conduct constitute an 
unreasonable risk of harm to another, he 
or she has the duty to refrain from that 
conduct." Id. (citing McLance v. Lindau, 63 
Md. App. 504, 514, 492 A.2d 1352, 1358 
(1985)). Moreover, 
[o]ne who knows he or she has a 
highly infectious disease can readily 
forsee the danger that the disease may 
be communicated to others with 
whom the infected person comes in 
J contact. As a consequence, the infected 
person has a duty to take reasonable 
precautions - whether by warning 
others or by avoiding contact with 
them - to avoid transmitting the dis-
ease. 
Id. at 142, 538 A.2d at 1179. 
Referring to the case at bar, it was alleg-
ed that Dr. K. knew he had active genital 
herpes, a highly contagious, sexually 
transmitted disease, that he had inter-
course with Ms. N., and as a result, Ms. N. 
contracted a serious, painful, and incurable 
disease. The Court of Appeals of Maryland 
held that if the averments of Ms. N's com-
plaint are believed, she has stated a cause of 
action in negligence that is cognizable 
under Maryland law. Id. at 143, 538 A.2d 
1179. 
The next cause of action examined was 
intentional infliction of emotional distress. 
The court noted that the independent tort 
of intentional infliction of emotional dis-
tress is sanctioned in Maryland. The four 
elements of the tort as identified in Harris 
v. Jones, 281 Md. 560, 566, 380 A.2d 611, 
614 (1977) are: 
1) The conduct must be intentional or 
reckless; 
2) The conduct must be extreme and 
outrageous; 
3) There must be a causal connection 
between the wrongful conduct and the 
emotional distress; 
4) The emotional distress must be 
severe. 
Id. at 144, 538 A.2d at 1179-80. 
One does not actually have to intend to 
inflict severe emotional distress. It is 
enough if "he knew that such distress was 
certain, or substantially certain, to result 
from his conduct; or where he acted reck-
lessly in deliberate disregard of a high 
degree of probability that the emotional 
distress would follow." Id. 
[O]ne who knowingly engages in con-
duct that is highly likely to infect 
another with an incurable disease of 
this nature, and who also is aware of 
the nature of the disease, not only 
engages in intentional or reckless con-
duct as those terms are defined in 
Harris; he or she has committed 
extreme and outrageous conduct. 
Id. at 146, 538 A.2d at 1181. Thus, assum-
ing proof of that conduct, the case easily 
crosses the "extreme and outrageous" 
threshold. 
Turning to the severity of the emotional 
distress, while it must be severe, the dis-
tress need not produce total emotional or 
physical disablement. Rather, the severity 
must be measured in light of the outra-
geousness of the conduct and the other ele-
ments of the tort. Id. at 148, 538 A.2d 
1182. (citing Reagan v. Rider, 70 Md. App. 
at 511, 521 A.2d at 1250). 
The court of appeals held that proof of 
the acts of Dr. K. establish the first three 
elements of the tort under Maryland law, 
and if sufficient emotional distress has 
been produced by that conduct, in light of 
all the evidence, Ms. N. is entitled to 
recover damages. Id. at 148-9, 538 A.2d at 
1182. 
The last cause of action which the Court 
of Appeals of Maryland viewed was fraud. 
The elements of fraud are: 
1) that a representation made by a par-
ty was false; 2) that either its falsity 
was known to that party or the mis-
representation was made with such 
reckless indifference to truth to 
impute knowledge to him; 3) that the 
misrepresentation was made for the 
purpose of defrauding some other per-
son; 4) that that person not only relied 
upon the misrepresentation but had 
the right to rely upon it with full belief 
of its truth, and that he would not 
have done the thing from which 
damage resulted if it had not been 
made; and 5) that the person suffered 
damage directly resulting from the 
misrepresentation. 
Id. at 149, 523 A.2d at 1182 (citing Subur· 
ban Mgmt. v. Johnson, 236 Md. 455, 460, 
204 A.2d 326, 329 (1964)). One who by a 
fraudulent misrepresentation or nondisclo-
sure of a fact that it is his duty to disclose 
causes physical harm to the person ... of 
another, who justifiably relies upon the 
misrepresentation, is subject to liability to 
the other. Id. at 150, 538 A.2d at 1182. This 
principal has been applied in Kathleen K. v. 
Robert B., 150 Cal. App. 3d 992, 198 Cal. 
Rptr. 273 (1984), a case whose facts are 
very similar to those alleged in this case, 
except here the charge is that Dr. K. con-
cealed the existence of genital herpes, 
rather than asserting that he was free of 
disease. Dr. K. attempted to distinguish 
this case from Kathleen K. because here 
there was no affirmative representation as 
to his good health. However, the court 
stated that if there is a duty to speak, the 
concealment can result in liability to the 
same extent that an actual denial of the 
existence of the fact would. B.N. at 151, 
538 A.2d at 1184. 
Based upon the implicit misrepresenta-
tion being material and Ms. N.'s assertions 
that she never would have engaged in sex 
with Dr. K. had she known the truth and 
that she suffered damage directly from the 
misrepresentation, the court held that Ms. 
N. stated a cause of action for fraud that is 
recognized in Marylarid. Id. at 153, 538 
A.2d 1184. 
By answering the certified question in 
the affirmative, the Court of Appeals of 
Maryland has clearly established that the 
causes of action of negligence, intentional 
infliction of emotional distress and fraud 
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will be recognized, when they result from 
the sexual transmission of a dangerous, 
contagious and incurable disease. Howev-
er, the plaintiff must make the requisite 
factual showing of each element in every 
case. 
-Jonathan s. Beiser 
A heart attack may start with pres-
sure, fullness, squeezing or 
pain in the middle of your chest. It 
can spread to your shoulderl?, 
neck or arms. Dizziness, fainting, 
sweating and shortness of 
breath may even occur. If you 
experience any of these symp-
toms for more than two minutes, 
call for emergency medical 
help immediately. The longer you 
wait, the more you risk dying. 
Which can be very painful for 
everyone who cares about you. 
6American Heart 
'V" Association 
WE'RE FIGHTING FOR 
'tOUR LIFE 
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Comptroller O/The Treasury Income Tax 
Division v. American Satellite Corpora-
tion: OUT-OF-STATE LOSSES SUF-
FERED BY MULTI-STATE CORP-
ORATION MAY BE USED TO OFF-
SET IN-STATE CAPITAL GAINS 
FOR TAX PURPOSES 
In Comptroller Of The Treasury Income 
Tax Division v. American Satellite Corpora· 
tion, 312 Md. 537, 540 A.2d 1146 (1988), 
the Court of Appeals of Maryland held 
that out-of-state losses, suffered by a multi-
state corporation reporting no federal taxa-
ble income, may offset in-state capital 
gains allocable to Maryland under Md. 
Ann. Code art. 81 § 316{bX3) (1957, 1980 
Repl. Vol.). The court of appeals determin-
ed that a corporation must have a "net 
income" as defined in Md. Ann. Code art. 
81, § 280A(a) (1957, 1980 Repl. Vol.) 
before § 316{b) comes into play. 
Section 280A(a) provides that the "net 
income" of a corporation is its taxable 
income as defined in the laws of the 
United States, thus equivalent to its federal 
taxable income. Sections 280A(b) and (c) 
provide items which are added to, or sub-
tracted from, a corporation's federal taxa-
ble income to determine its final "net 
income." Section 316{b) provides the 
means of allocating the "net income" of 
multi-state corporations between 
Maryland and other states where the cor-
poration does business. 
The Comptroller of the Treasury made 
an assessment of $252,786.36 against 
American Satellite Corporation (ASC) for 
a claimed deficiency from a $5,000,000 
intangible capital gain that ASC realized in 
1982. This gain was allocable to Maryland 
under § 316{bX3), which provided that a 
corporation's capital gains and losses from 
sales of intangible personal property were 
allocable to Maryland if the corporation 
had its domicile in Maryland. At the time 
of the Comptroller's assessment in 1982, 
ASC's domicile was Maryland (this situs 
allocation provision of 316{a) and (b) was 
repealed in 1984). 
In 1982, ASC filed a consolidated federal 
tax return with Fairchild Industries, its 
parent company. H ASC had filed a sep-
arate tax return, as required by Md. Ann. 
Code art. 81, § 295, its federal taxable 
income for 1982 would have been 
$1,437,808. However, ASC had net 
operating losses carried over from previ-
ous years that amounted to $51,687,594. 
These net operating losses completely off-
set ASC's federal taxable income for 1982, 
thus reducing its income to zero. Conse-
quently, ASC asserted that it had no "net 
income" under § 280A(a) and showed no 
taxable income on its Maryland return. 
Later, ASC acknowledged that it did owe 
$14,229 as Maryland taxable income for 
state and local income taxes as required by 
§ 280A(b), and for personal property taxes 
as required by Md. Ann. Code art. 81, § 
288(g) (1957, 1980 Repl. Vol.). 
The Comptroller, however, determined 
that ASC owed $252,786.36 in taxes. He 
arrived at this number by apportioning 
ASC's net operating losses to only 
$1,297,452, instead of the $51,687,594 that 
ASC claimed. The Comptroller arrived at 
the smaller number by making the follow-
ing calculations: (1) he took the $14,229 
(zero federal taxable income plus the § 
280A(b) and § 288(g) modifications); (2) he 
subtracted the $5,000,000 capital gain, sub-
ject to 100% situs allocation under § 
316{b)(3), from the $14,229 (allocable 
items are 100% taxable to Maryland and 
should not be apportioned); (3) this 
resulted in $-4,985,771; (4) he multiplied 
this number by the three-factor apportion-
ment fraction of .260231 (this comes from 
a formula which takes into account prop-
erty, payroll and sales, which are opera-
tions subject to apportionment) under § 
316{c), which equalled $-1,297,452; (5) 
then he added back the $5,000,000 allo-
cated capital gain not subject to apportion-
ment; (6) which left $3,702,548 as 
Maryland taxable income; (7) which was 
multiplied by the 7% tax rate provided for 
under § 288; (8) which totalled 
$259,178.36; (9) from which $6,392.00 was 
subtracted as governed by § 288(g); this left 
a final tax owed of $252,786.36. 
The Comptroller's view was that § 
316{b)(3) worked in the same manner as § 
§ 280A(b) and (c), that is, to modify the 
federal taxable base. He supported his posi-
tion by arguing that when the statute is 
read as a whole, the words "[E]xcept as 
hereinafter modified" from § 280A(a), 
included the provisions of § 316(b)(3) as 
additions to taxable base. Thus, the Comp-
troller's position was that capital gains 
were allocable to Maryland under § 
316{b)(3) if the taxpayer's domicile was 
Maryland. Since out-of-state profits were 
not taxable in Maryland, the Comptroller 
felt that out-of-state losses should not be 
used to offset Maryland capital gains. 
Therefore, he determined that even 
though ASC had no "net income" for fed-
eral tax purposes, ASC's capital gain 
would be subject to Maryland income tax. 
On April 16, 1986, the Maryland Tax 
Court ordered the assessment of the 
Comptroller to be reversed. The tax court 
felt that § 316 modifications arise only 
"when a corporation has net income as 
defined under § 280A." Comptroller Of 
The Treasury Income Tax Division v. Amer-
ican Satellite Corporation, __ Md. -> 
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